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is largely irrelevant, for they are products of a liberal culture which emphasizes 
precisely this sort of ambiguity. In short, if "distance" in the latter sense is 
essential to morality, then it would seem to me that (until quite recently) very 
few of those mystics who have interpreted their experiences in I-Thou categories 
have been moral-a conclusion which I find hard to accept. 
It would be unfair to conclude on a negative note. The issues which Home 
raises are important, and a number of his observations and distinctions are 
suggestive. In particular, serious consideration should be given to his central 
thesis, viz., that while mysticism can enhance morality by providing it with 
depth and motivation, the sources of moral life are largely non-mystical, and 
that mysticism by itself is insufficient to support morality. I suspect that this 
may be true. In any case it deserves our attention. 
Epistemology: The Justification o/Belie/, by David L. Wolfe, InterVarsity Press, 
1983, pp. 92. $3.95. 
Reviewed by JAMES A. KELLER, Wofford College. 
This book is in the Contours o/Christian Philosophy series of "short introduc-
tory-level textbooks in the various fields of philosophy." Its style should be of 
great help in communicating with beginning-level students, for it is simply and 
clearly written and employs well chosen examples to clarify difficult points. 
Moreover, the author makes a serious effort to grasp the attention and interest 
of the intended readers by focusing on an issue about which college under-
graduates might have doubts and on which techniques for assessing beliefs might 
be welcomed. Thus there is no consideration of Gettier-type problems, and one 
hears nothing of bam-facades or of grebes. Nor does one find the problem of 
proving that an external world exists, only its notation as a problem which did 
not arouse the interest of undergraduates (p. 14). Instead. the primary focus is 
on religious and metaphysical beliefs (p. 18), which also provide the most 
common source of illustrations. Nevertheless, the argument and conclusions 
would be applicable to issues other than these, though more copious use of other 
issues as illustrations might help drive home this point with beginning under-
graduates. 
Although, as Wolfe notes, epistemology traditionally was defined as "the 
study of the possibility and nature of knowledge" (p. 14), the book is not 
concerned with knowledge but with justified belief, or more precisely with what 
is involved in showing that a belief is justified or "to put it somewhat differently" 
that our assertions are warranted (p. 15). He promises to return later to the 
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question of how warrant relates to knowledge (p. 17), but I could not find any 
place where he did so. The book, then, is a sustained consideration of the question 
of how we can show that our beliefs are justified or our assertions are warranted. 
It is worth noting that he tends to confuse or equate the question of when we 
are justified and the question of when we can show that we are justified in a 
certain belief. 1 Though these may be equivalent questions in some epistemologies, 
they are not in general equivalent, and certainly no advocate of externalist theories 
of justification will accept their equivalence. 
After a brief introductory chapter in which he articulates the problem, Wolfe 
discusses four historically important views on how beliefs are justified: (I) Pure 
Rationalism (e.g., Descartes); (2) Immediate Experience (Naive Empiricism); 
(3) Reasoning from Experience (Inferential Empiricism); and (4) Critical Interpre-
tation. Each of these views is clearly explained and criticized. In light of the 
criticisms of each of these views, Wolfe poses the possibility of relativism at 
the end of the chapter. 
In the next chapter, he tries to answer the challenge of relativism. He accepts 
Quine'S picture of our beliefs as forming an interconnected web whose interior 
portions comprise an interpretive scheme or framework, and he tries to answer 
three questions about assessing such interpretive schemes: (1) How is it possible 
to gain non-arbitrary criteria to appraise such schemes? (2) "How can experience 
be of any help in assessing an interpretive scheme if experience itself is interpreted 
in light of that scheme?" and (3) If conclusive verification for a scheme is not 
possible, what sort of standing can one ascribe to a warranted scheme? He 
answers (1) that criteria emerge in the clarification of tasks. If one's task is to 
make sense out of one's total experience (the metaphysical task), then the approp-
riate criteria for one's interpretive scheme are internal consistency and coherence 
(without which one does not have a system of assertions at all) and comprehen-
siveness and congruency (without which one's system of assertions will not 
interpret one's total experience). Furthermore, he claims, individual beliefs (as-
sertions) are justified (assessed) only by assessing the scheme to which they 
belong (pp. 57-58). (Here I would demur. It seems to me that assessing the 
scheme is at most a necessary condition and not in general a sufficient condition 
for assessing individual assertions-a point to which I shall return.) 
He answers (2) above by furnishing several examples of experiences changing 
a person's beliefs. He provides an account of what happens in these cases by 
recurring to Quine's web analogy. When a person is faced with an experience 
(or more commonly, a series of experiences) which she cannot assimilate, she 
may do one of several things, including changing her system of beliefs. It seems 
to me that here again clarity requires that one distinguish between assessing (or 
changing) a system of beliefs and assessing (or changing) a single belief framed 
within a system, for these two issues have far different implications for the 
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problem being discussed. Indeed the problem arises only in relation to the first 
issue. For example, belief in a physical world (an interpretive framework) is not 
affected by believing or not believing that a tree is in a certain location. And 
Christian theism (another interpretive scheme) is not affected by believing or 
not believing that God comforted me on some particular occasion. The belief 
about the tree and the belief about God logically require the truth of certain 
interpretive frameworks, but the frameworks are not affected by the truth or 
falsity of these beliefs. Thus, assessing the frameworks will not be sufficient to 
enable us to assess the particular beliefs. And beginning students (and other 
laypersons) may well wonder how these beliefs should be assessed. 
In his answer to question (3), Wolfe's debt to Popper, already apparent at 
several places, becomes especially clear. Interpretive schemes cannot be verified, 
but they can be falsified. Those which have been subjected to criticism and have 
survived the criticism may be said to be corroborated or "plausible or even 
probable (in a nonmathematical sense)" (p. 65). Wolfe does not subject this 
falsificationist approach to any critical evaluation, though the problems with 
falsificationism arising from the problems with treating basic statements (i.e., 
statements about particular events and individuals) as falsifiable are too well 
known to need rehearsal here. 2 This omission is, of course, quite consistent with 
his failure to deal with the assessment of statements about particular events. 
As an overall strategy for the reader to arrive at a warranted interpretive 
scheme, Wolfe proposes: 
Start where you are. Continue with (or choose, depending on where 
you are) the interpretive scheme which is personally the most important 
or interesting to you and pursue it as long as it does not succumb to 
active criticism. (p. 68) 
He adds that in doing this, one should actively seek dialogue with adherents of 
other schemes in order to subject one's own scheme to criticism. 
Wolfe's final chapter considers the relation between the foregoing epistemolog-
ical conclusions and the Christian faith. He begins by claiming that all our beliefs 
(common-sense, scientific, religious, ideological, etc.) are risky hypotheses 
which can be warranted only as they are subjected to appropriate criticism and 
survive it. Thus faith is inherent in all human cognitive enterprises, for we are 
always committing ourselves to beliefs and actions where we lack complete 
verification of the beliefs. Rationality in beliefs does not require that we never 
make such commitments, but that we always be open to criticism of our beliefs. 
Is such openness consistent with Christian faith? Wolfe answers that it is, for 
such openness merely involves admitting that one's beliefs might be wrong, not 
admitting that they are wrong. He adds, though, that the believer need not seek 
to disprove his beliefs with the same systematic purpose that characterizes the 
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scientist (at least as falsificationists describe the scientist); it is enough if the 
believer lives on the basis of his faith and is open to seeing inadequacies in his 
beliefs. 
As an introduction to epistemology, this book has clarity, simplicity, and 
focus on a single issue of interest to undergraduates as its great strengths. On 
the other hand, this single focus also means that other important epistemological 
issues are slighted. Thus, Wolfe's book is nowhere near as comprehensive as 
Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge in the Prentice-Hall series of introductory 
books. But Wolfe's book is also simpler and considerably shorter than 
Chisholm's; making it significantly more comprehensive would make it a different 
book. On the other hand, even within its length and focus, I found some matters 
troubling. Two of these I have already discussed: the failure to consider the 
assessment of statements about individual events and the equation (confusion) 
of whether one is justified with whether one can show that one is justified. To 
these I would add a third: the understanding of foundationalism as requiring 
incorrigible and absolutely certain foundations (p. 58). While this was often true 
historically (certainly of such figures as Descartes and Spinoza), there are more 
modest foundationalisms which require only that a foundational belief have some 
immediate justifiedness-i.e., some justifiedness independent of other beliefs. 
But the belief's justifiedness is limited and defeasible; nevertheless, the belief 
is foundational because it is immediately justified to some extent and because 
it plays a part in the justification of non-foundational beliefs. J My criticisms are 
not unrelated. One of the central arguments for foundationalism is its ability to 
stop epistemic regress; often it does so at beliefs about individual events which 
are (purportedly) immediately justified. And one of the central criticisms of 
foundationalism is the purported dogmatism involved in accepting any belief 
which is not justified in tem1S of other beliefs. But often this criticism rests on 
the refusal to make the distinction between being justified in a belief and showing 
that one is justified in a belief. 4 It seems to me that some consideration of these 
matters would have resulted in a more balanced and useful book without greatly 
increasing its size. 
NOTES 
I. Cf., e.g., his statement on p. 16 that "the degree to which we are justified in our beliefs about 
this seems to be dependent on examining available reasons." But does it not depend on the reasons 
themselves, rather than on our examining them? 
2. Cf., e.g., Harold I. Brown, Perception, Theory and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), chp. 5. 
3. A number of recent authors have articulated versions of modest foundationalism, among them 
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Robert Audi in several of his papers; cf., e.g., "Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and 
Defeasibility," Synthese, 55 (1983), 119-39, esp. pp. 128-30. This and other issues raised in my 
critical comments are also illuminated in William P. Alston, "Two Types of Foundationalism," The 
Journal of Philosophy, LXXIII, 7 (April 8, 1976), 165-85. 
4. Cf. Alston's article cited in the previous note. 
Is God a Creationist?, ed. by Roland M. Frye. New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons. $15.95, paper $9.95. 
Reviewed by FREDERICK J. CROSSON, University of Notre Dame. 
Despite the rather odd title, this is a useful collection of eleven essays, drawn 
from diverse sources (conferences, magazines, books) and stitched together by 
an editorial prologue and epilogue. Six of the pieces address the creationist 
controversy directly, the others deal with the relations of science and religion 
or with scriptural exegesis (especially of Genesis 1-3). Five of the essays are by 
physical scientists and three by scripture scholars. 
The occasion for the book, as for its first six essays, is the appearance on the 
American scene of "creation science" or creationism. Vigorously pressed by its 
supporters-mostly through state legislature--creation science is presented as 
an alternative theory to evolution in accounting for the origin of living forms 
and of the fossil record. As an alternative theory, its supporters have sought to 
gain access for it to the way in which biology is taught, especially on the high 
school level. The most recent case involved an Arkansas law of 1981 which 
required that equal time be given to creation science wherever evolution was 
taught in the schools. In 1982 a Federal District Court found the law unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that, being specifically linked to the Bible, the mandated 
teaching represented an establishment of religion. 
In an attempt to deflect this interpretation of the law in advance, the defendants 
filed a "Findings of Fact" which included this extraordinary claim: 
Creation-science does presuppose the existence of a creator, to the same 
degree that evolution-science presupposes the existence of no creator. 
As used in the context of creation-science, as defined by 54(a) (sic) of 
Act 590, the terms or concepts of "creation" and "creator" are not 
inherently religious terms or concepts. In this sense, the term "creator" 
means only some entity with power, intelligence, and a sense of design_ 
Creation-science does not require a creator who has a personality, who 
has the attributes of love, compassion, justice, etc., which are ordinarily 
attributed to a diety. Indeed, the creation-science model does not require 
that the creator still be in existence. 
